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Abstract
Consolidation in the euro area banking sector has been slow since the end of the 
global financial crisis, despite the persistent weak bank profitability. The coronavirus 
(COVID-19) pandemic has reinforced profitability risks in the euro area banking 
sector, and coincided with worse performance of some banks, notably those 
burdened with legacy non-performing loans. Consolidation among banks may bring 
benefits from both a micro- and a macroprudential perspective by generating cost 
synergies, increasing revenue diversification and strengthening the resilience of the 
banking sector. However, it comes with attendant execution risks, which need to be 
properly managed by banks. Consolidation may give rise to competition concerns, 
although empirical evidence suggests that there is room for further domestic 
concentration in some euro area countries and for greater cross-border integration of 
the European banking market. Bank mergers also increase the systemic footprint 
of the resulting institutions, which might be addressed by the existing macroprudential 
and resolution frameworks. The European Central Bank assesses consolidation 
from a prudential perspective, focusing on the current and future ability of the 
combined bank to comply with prudential requirements. To this end, it published a 
Guide in January 2021 in which it clarified its expectations and approach to three 
key prudential issues arising in the context of consolidation: setting Pillar 2 capital 
requirements, treatment of badwill and use of internal models. 
1 Introduction
Consolidation has long been seen by policymakers as part of the solution to the excess 
capacity and weak profitability of the euro area banking sector [see, among others, 
Constâncio (2014) and Af Jochnick (2019)]. In spite of the lively discussion on the need 
for bank consolidation and related challenges and obstacles, not many bank mergers 
and acquisitions have taken place in the last decade. Many of these acquisitions were 
executed in the context of resolution or financial distress of the target bank, rather than 
being driven by purely commercial interests. At the same time, bank profitability remained 
subdued during the economic upswing between 2013 and 2019. The COVID-19 
pandemic, and the likely pressure it will put on banks’ profits, has again brought the 
challenges associated with weak bank profitability and the related discussion on bank 
consolidation into the spotlight, and some consolidation has begun to happen. 
This article revisits the arguments in favour of consolidation as a remedy for bank 
profitability challenges and elaborates on ways in which consolidation in the banking 
sector can contribute to improving financial stability. In doing so, the article combines 
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micro- and macroprudential perspectives. Highlighting the latest supervisory 
expectations announced by the European Central Bank (ECB), the article outlines 
the key areas of supervisory attention and the approach to selected key issues 
[ECB (2021)]. It also points to other issues which are relevant for consolidation, but 
which lie outside of the remit of micro- and macroprudential authorities.1
2 Why bank profitability matters for financial stability and banking supervision 
Sustainable bank profitability is one of the necessary conditions for achieving financial 
stability. The ECB defines financial stability as a state in which the financial system – 
which comprises financial intermediaries, markets and market infrastructures – is 
capable of withstanding shocks and the unravelling of financial imbalances [Fell and 
Schinasi (2005)]. Banks play a key role in the financial system in the euro area, being the 
largest provider of credit. Their profits are a key source of the new capital that is needed 
to support financial intermediation and economic growth. Strong earnings also provide 
the first line of defence against losses in a downturn, which increases the resilience of 
banks and helps them fulfil their role as lenders to the real economy [Jiménez et al. 
(2012)]. In turn, robust credit supply facilitates recoveries from economic downturns.
Focusing on the safety and soundness of individual institutions, bank supervisors 
take an interest in bank profitability for similar reasons. Weak profitability reduces the 
resilience of banks, indicating heightened risks to capital. It may also be a symptom 
of structural weaknesses in business models. The European Banking Authority (EBA) 
expects bank supervisors in the European Union (EU) to conduct regular business 
model analysis as part of the annual Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process 
(SREP), which leads to the setting of bank-specific Pillar 2 capital requirements. 
Through such analysis, authorities aim to determine whether a bank is able to 
generate acceptable returns over a horizon of at least three years [EBA (2014a)].
The presence of unprofitable banks in the economy could amplify risks to financial 
stability. Banks which do not earn their cost of capital may face a higher cost of funding 
and be more vulnerable to liquidity runs, which may cause contagion to other banks. 
Unprofitable banks may also have an incentive to take on additional risk (or otherwise 
gamble for resurrection), as the downside to their shareholders would be limited, while 
they stand to benefit under an optimistic outcome in which risks do not materialise [see 
Baldursson and Portes (2013)]. Such behaviour could also put unhealthy competitive 
pressure on the sounder banks, thereby negatively affecting the wider banking sector. 
At the systemic level, exuberant risk-taking may fuel credit booms and asset price 
bubbles, which, once burst, can cause financial crises and severe recessions.
1 Throughout this article, the terms “microprudential authority” and “macroprudential authority” commonly refer to 
“competent authority” and “designated authority”, respectively, under the EU capital requirements directive and 
regulation (CRD/CRR).
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3 Euro area bank profitability during the COVID-19 crisis 
Euro area banks were already underperforming vis-à-vis their international peers 
before the start of the pandemic. Chart 1 below shows that the return on equity 
(RoE) in the euro area in 2017, 2018 and 2019 was persistently lower than that 
achieved by US banks. Moreover, for many banks, returns were below the estimated 
cost of equity, which is the return investors would require to invest in bank equity 
(see Chart 2). That being said, some euro area banks were able to earn more than 
their cost of equity before the outbreak of the coronavirus in 2020, and these well-
performing banks could be found among banks following different business models 
and operating in different countries [ECB (2018)]
Both cyclical and structural factors explain the low bank profitability in the euro area. 
As regards the former, the macro-financial environment in the euro area after 2007 
was challenging. The global financial crisis of 2007/2008 morphed into the sovereign 
debt crisis, leading to a double-dip recession. Consequently, provisioning costs 
surged, resulting in a strong decline in bank profits between 2010 and 2012 
(see  Chart  1), while at the same time banks accumulated a large stock of non-
performing loans (NPLs). In the second half of 2010s, amid a more supportive growth 
environment, bank profitability recovered from the trough. Yet, it never returned to 
levels in line with cost of equity. In response to the very low inflation prevailing in that 
period, monetary policy adopted a historically accommodative stance. In that 
environment, bank interest margins were gradually eroded, adding cyclical challenges 
to profitability. On the other hand, monetary policy reduced the cost of credit risk 
and cost of funding, and enabled banks to benefit from one-off capital gains 
associated with higher asset prices [see Albertazzi et al.  (2020) and Altavilla 
et al. (2019)].
While cyclical factors are important, they only partly explain weak bank profitability 
in the euro area. Structural inefficiencies, in particular operational inefficiencies at 
the level of individual banks and significant overcapacity in the sector overall, are 
also relevant [see ECB (2018)]. As already explained by Andreeva et al. (2019), these 
two phenomena are related. Overcapacity in the euro area tends to manifest itself in 
a fragmented marketplace with numerous competitors with limited capacity to 
sustainably cover their costs, including the cost of risk (too many weak banks). These 
in turn maintain costly overlapping branch networks (excess of physical infrastructure) 
[see Gardó and Klaus (2019)]. 
Much of the weakness in euro area bank profitability in the period 2015-2018 was 
found to relate to a set of institutions which persistently underperformed throughout 
that period [see Andreeva et al. (2019)]. Although, at first sight, these underperforming 
institutions were quite diverse in terms of geographical location, balance sheet 
structure and size, they in fact formed three relatively clearly defined groups. The 
first group included banks that were burdened by high levels of NPLs. They also 
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exhibited relatively high income-to-assets ratios (probably reflecting higher interest 
rates on loans, given the risky profile of their borrowers) and clearly elevated cost-
to-income ratios (probably reflecting the cost of managing a large legacy asset 
portfolio). The second group comprised banks with a weak income-generating 
capacity, all of which displayed a low income-to-assets ratio. Despite a lean cost 
structure, their cost-to-income ratios were clearly elevated between 2015 and 2018. 
The third group included banks with multiple sources of weak profitability, typically 
a combination of cost-side and revenue-side problems.
BANK PROFITABILITY SINCE 2010 (RETURN ON EQUITY; PERCENTAGES PER ANNUM)
Chart 1
SOURCES: Bloomberg and ECB calculations.
NOTE: Based on a sample of 21 banks in the euro area, five in the United Kingdom and 17 in the United States for which long time series are available. 
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Chart 2
SOURCES: CB and ECB calculations.
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Unfortunately, these institutions are continuing to underperform. Chart 3 compares 
the evolution of RoE and cost-to-income ratios of these underperforming banks and 
their healthier peers. Looking at the median bank in each group, underperformers 
continue to generate only half the RoE of their peers and operate at a cost-to-income 
ratio comparable to the top quartile of other banks. 
The decline in profitability in 2020 has been steeper for the set of institutions 
carrying a high burden of legacy NPLs (see Chart 4) as their cost of risk increased, 
although this partly reflects management actions initiated before the pandemic. 
These banks continued to make progress in cleaning balance sheets from legacy 
assets (visible in a continued decline in NPL ratios) and improved their operational 
efficiency (a combination of leaner cost structures and stronger revenue sides). 
Moreover, given that their RoE was the lowest to start with, in late 2020 (the latest 
data available) the high NPL group was in fact making sizable losses. By contrast, 
the group of institutions with weak income-generating capacity was not as 
significantly affected. 
Overall this result is not surprising. A key difference between the high NPL group 
and the weak income-generators is the average riskiness of their assets. The 
legacy asset carriers have lending relationships with riskier borrowers, while 
banks with weak income-generating capacity are focused on low-risk, low-return 
investments. Since weaker borrowers are generally affected more strongly and 
quickly by cyclical downturns, and may not have been able to benefit from 
BANKS THAT UNDERPERFORMED BETWEEN 2015 AND 2018 CONTINUE TO COMPARE UNFAVOURABLY TO THEIR PEERS
Chart 3
SOURCES: ECB and ECB calculations.
NOTE: Based on a sample of significant institutions. The group of underperformers includes 37 banks.
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government support measures such as loan guarantees,2 the provisioning costs 
of the high NPL group increased markedly, adversely affecting bottom-line 
profitability. 
Financial market participants expect a gradual recovery in euro area bank profitability 
over the next two years (see Chart 5). Industry analysts expect RoE to be around 3% 
in 2021 and to increase further to 5% in 2022. As in the pre-pandemic period, the 
performance of euro area banks compares unfavourably to their international peers 
(see Chart 5, left panel). In 2022 more than half of the listed institutions for which 
analyst expectations are available are expected to generate RoE of less than 6%, the 
lower end of the range for banks’ cost of equity. The availability of earnings forecasts 
is limited and does not allow firm conclusions to be drawn on the expected profitability 
of underperforming banks, even less so of the three groups of underperformers. 
Nonetheless, market analysts continue to see them lagging behind their peers in 
early 2021 (see Chart 5, right panel).
The performance of the three groups of underperforming banks reaffirms the 
conclusions of Andreeva et al. (2019), who identified consolidation as the most 
appropriate strategy for banks with sound balance sheets but weak income-
generating capacity. Indeed, this group of banks seems to not only have been the 
2 Access to such measures was often conditional upon borrowers having no prior financial difficulties, so as to 
confine government support to viable companies. 
THE COVID-19 CRISIS DISPROPORTIONATELY AFFECTED BANKS BURDENED WITH HIGH NPLs (PERCENTAGE POINT
CHANGES BETWEEN Q4 2019 AND Q3 2020)
Chart 4
SOURCES: ECB and ECB calculations. 
NOTES: Based on a sample of significant institutions. Changes in cross-sectional median RoE, CET1 ratio, NPL ratio and cost-to-income ratio 
between Q4 2019 and Q3 2020 (the latest available data point). There were 37 underperforming banks, of which seven were in Group 1, 11 in Group 2 





























2  CET 1 RATIO 3  NPL RATIO 4  COST-TO-INCOME RATIO1  RETURN ON EQUITY
%%% %
GROUP 1: HIGH NPLs GROUP 2: WEAK INCOME-GENERATING CAPACITY GROUP 3: DIVERSE ISSUES GROUP 4: OTHER BANKS
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 91 FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW, ISSUE 40 SPRING 2021
most resilient among underperformers to the shock of the pandemic but also more 
resilient than the average bank which did not underperform in the past, indicating 
that the financial risks arising from their hypothetical participation in mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As) would have been contained. These banks also made progress 
towards reducing their excessive cost base during the pandemic. By contrast, 
Andreeva et al. (2019) suggested that where profitability was weak due to a high 
stock of NPLs, and NPL problems were idiosyncratic to a specific bank, acquisition 
of the sound parts of the business by a healthy bank may be possible. Where NPL 
problems are systemic in nature, system-wide measures to reduce NPLs may have 
to complement consolidation in remediating the weak profitability. 
EXPECTED BANK PROFITABILITY IN THE EURO AREA IS WEAKER THAN IN OTHER ADVANCED ECONOMIES POST-COVID-19
Chart 5
SOURCES: Bloomberg and Refinitiv.
NOTE: The chart shows the median analyst forecast across listed banks in each jurisdiction based on a large sample of listed banks. Nordea is
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4 Consolidation as part of the solution
Consolidation in the banking sector may address some of the root causes of weak 
bank profitability in the euro area. Acquisitions can reduce overcapacity and provide 
an opportunity to decisively reduce the excessive cost base of the banking sector, 
but they also entail risks for the banks involved and side effects for competition, 
market structure and financial stability which need to be carefully analysed. Although 
consolidation activity may give rise to substantial benefits, the ECB remains neutral 
on specific consolidation projects, which should be first and foremost driven by 
market forces and the economic interests of the parties involved. The role of 
supervisors is to assess such transactions from a prudential perspective. 
Consolidation may also not always be the right solution, and should not crowd out 
other means of restoring sustainable profitability, such as tackling cost inefficiencies 
and improving income diversification. 
4.1 Potential benefits and risks associated with bank M&As
Merger and acquisition activity in the European banking sector has been slow since 
the end of the global financial crisis [see ECB (2020)]. Consolidation of European 
banks proceeded in two waves. Strong domestic M&A activity in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s3 was followed by a brief slowdown during the economic downturn, 
reaching a trough in 2003. As the European economy grew rapidly and European 
economic and financial integration progressed in the run-up to the global financial 
crisis, cross-border transactions accounted for a major part of overall M&A activity, 
culminating in 2007.4 Since the crisis, the value of bank mergers has remained at a 
small fraction of pre-crisis levels. This has been ascribed to low bank valuations, 
weak profitability, and increasing regulatory constraints [Hartmann et al. (2017) and 
Krusec  (2020)]. Low valuations in particular may have discouraged banks from 
bidding for potential acquisition targets during this period, as the costs of 
consolidation (e.g. in terms of restructuring charges) were seen as difficult to absorb 
without raising new, costly capital, which could dilute existing shareholders. However, 
low valuations of a potential target offer an opportunity for a healthy acquirer who 
may be able to purchase the target at a sizeable discount relative to the fair value 
of acquired assets and liabilities. The resulting badwill could help absorb the costs of 
consolidation and reinforce the capitalisation of the merged entity. In such cases, 
robust valuation of badwill would be essential, as an overly generous estimate of 
badwill might be perceived as inflating the value of assets which may in the future 
3 For example, this wave resulted in the creation of BBVA through the merger of BBV and Argentaria (1999), the 
creation of Unicredit and Banca Intesa through a series of mergers of Italian banks, and the merger of Banque 
Nationale de Paris and Paribas to form BNP Paribas (2000). 
4 Prominent examples include the 2007 acquisition of ABN AMRO by a consortium of Fortis, Royal Bank of Scotland 
and Banco Santander, which at the time was the largest bank merger in the world, as well as the acquisitions of 
Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank by Unicredit in 2005 and of Abbey National by Banco Santander in 2004. 
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require a write-down. Lifting some misconceptions about these issues in order to 
favour resilient consolidations was one important motivation for the publication of 
the Guide on the ECB’s supervisory approach [see ECB (2021)].
Motivations for bank consolidation vary depending on the type of transaction. 
Bijsterbosch and Deghi (2017) found that cost synergies are a frequent rationale for 
mergers, particularly in the domestic context, and that less cost-efficient banks have 
a greater probability of becoming the target of an acquisition. At the same time, 
cross-border transactions are often associated with seeking new business 
opportunities, although the dearth of cross-border mergers since the global financial 
crisis suggests that this case for mergers might have lost some of its appeal amidst 
the overall reduction in the size and international footprint of European banks in 
recent years. The literature also notes that some M&A transactions may not follow 
value-creation objectives. Misaligned incentives generated by management 
remuneration linked to the growth of banks may be a motivation for acquisitions 
[Anderson et al. (2004)]. Such transactions may be particularly problematic from a 
prudential perspective, because bank executives may not have the right incentives 
to conduct appropriate due diligence or to manage the risks of the transaction.
By enabling investment, unlocking economies of scale and allowing diversification, 
consolidation should facilitate banks’ preparations to face long-term challenges. 
Lower marginal costs allow the merged entity to invest and adjust its business model 
to the long-term challenges, such as those related to adoption of digital technologies 
and the transition towards a low-carbon economy. The scale of such investments 
may be unsustainable for smaller banks, but achievable for the merged entities. 
The track record of bank mergers is mixed and indicates that proposed transactions 
should be carefully evaluated. Altunbas and Marqués-Ibáñez (2004) assessed the 
effect of mergers on bank profitability in Europe as moderately positive based on 
data from the 1990s and early 2000s. They also noted the strategic diversification 
benefits provided by cross-border mergers. But more recent assessments have 
come to less positive conclusions. Beccalli and Frantz (2009), whose data end in the 
mid 2000s, found that M&As undertaken by European banks led to a slight 
deterioration in bank profitability, as efficiency gains were largely passed on to the 
customers. Behr and Heid (2011) estimate the medium-term effects to be broadly 
neutral. Based on a review of empirical literature, Kolaric and Schiereck (2014) 
conclude that the evidence of performance improvements following M&A transactions 
is mixed and may vary across countries. When focusing on stock market reactions 
to M&A transactions, they find that shareholders in target entities seem to benefit 
from M&As, but that the benefits to the acquirer are less clear-cut. 
Case studies underscore the financial and operational risks that bank mergers bring. 
Examining one of the most prominent banking collapses in the global financial crisis, 
namely Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), the UK Financial Services Authority [FSA (2011)] 
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concluded that the acquisition of ABN AMRO by RBS was among six key factors in 
its subsequent failure. The FSA found that the acquisition had been conducted 
without appropriate heed to the risks and with insufficient due diligence. RBS was 
judged to have overpaid for the target, to have accepted a risky funding strategy for 
the deal, and to have been overconfident in its ability to integrate the business of 
ABN AMRO. Similarly, insufficient due diligence regarding legacy assets acquired in 
the takeover of Dresdner Bank contributed to the financial distress and state-led 
recapitalisation of Commerzbank in 2008. Analysing the factors that led to the 
financial sector assistance programme for Spain, the European Commission (2012) 
noted that bank mergers in the savings bank sector – owing to the specificities of 
their applicable regulations and their limitations to raise capital – involved institutions 
with the same business model, helped reduce excess capacity and sometimes 
created larger entities that were not more resilient. Subsequently, several of the 
savings banks required recapitalisation by the Spanish authorities.5 
Consolidation can carry benefits and risks to financial stability and market structure. 
A transaction which improves the resilience and business models of individual firms 
is likely to be positive from a financial stability perspective, as the merged entity 
becomes more resilient and therefore a shock absorber rather than a shock amplifier 
in times of crisis. By absorbing weaker targets, acquirers would remove the weakest 
players that have been unable to earn their cost of capital for many years, sometimes 
since the financial crisis of 2008. When well-designed and well-executed, 
consolidation transactions can contribute to the overall financial soundness of the 
banking system [Fernandez-Bollo (2020)]. When mature acquirers decide to absorb 
weaker targets in the market, the latter benefit from the best practices and good 
governance framework of the acquirers, which creates significant efficiency gains 
for the system [Shaffer (1993), Ayadi et al. (2013)]. This would also strengthen the 
stability and resilience of the banking system. In the monetary union, cross-border 
bank penetration leads to stronger private risk-sharing, which helps smooth the 
effect of domestic shocks on consumption [Giovannini et al. (2018)].
There is evidence that, despite risks to competition, further consolidation may 
improve the structure of the euro area banking market. On one hand, consolidation 
may distort the competitive banking market structure. Increasing their market power, 
larger banks could extract rent from customers, leading to a socially suboptimal 
provision of financial services. Hartmann et al. (2017) and Andreeva et al. (2019) 
show that concentration and market power in the European banking market have 
increased over the last two decades and that the market power of euro area 
significant institutions is markedly higher than that of less significant institutions. 
Nevertheless, at least on aggregate, consolidation of the euro area banking sector 
5 The Spanish authorities committed €10.5 billion in 2010 to facilitating integration processes among savings banks. 
Spanish banks received further capital support amounting to €44.3 billion between 2011 and 2013 directed 
mainly at the former savings banks [see FROB (2019)].
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has not come at the expense of customers. The increase in estimated market power 
came through reduced marginal cost of providing banking services, rather than 
through banks’ ability to charge higher mark-ups. Anolli et al. (2015) also conclude 
that there is further room for consolidation that would not give excessive market 
power to individual banks. The competitive landscape in the European banking 
sector could therefore become healthier, while maintaining a sound degree of 
competition. Cross-border consolidation may also be beneficial to customers if new 
entrants improve the quality of banking services or are able to offer lower prices than 
incumbents.
Consolidation may also raise concerns about increased systemic risks owing to the 
increasing importance of large banks, although these are mitigated by the international 
regulatory framework. The creation of even larger and more systemically important 
banks through mergers may have adverse side effects, as the merged banks may 
increasingly benefit from an implicit subsidy associated with them being perceived 
as “too big to fail”. The presence of very large banks may also make the financial 
sector prone to contagion, as sparse interbank networks dominated by a few central 
nodes could be less resilient to stress than more decentralised banking systems 
[Acemoglu et al. (2015)]. Excessive size may also lead to diseconomies of scale, as 
large financial conglomerates may be unwieldy to manage [Huljak, Martin and 
Moccero (2019)]. Following the global financial crisis, global and European regulators 
have scrutinised the systemic importance of large and complex banks and have 
adopted a range of reforms aimed at containing the systemic risks posed by such 
institutions and at ensuring that they can be resolved in an orderly fashion if they fail. 
Their evaluation is ongoing, and the preliminary findings suggest that banks have 
been made more resilient and resolvable [FSB (2020)]. However, the effectiveness of 
these reforms remain to be tested in practice. 
4.2  Compatibility of M&As with prudential objectives: an assessment 
framework
The above considerations show clearly that not every proposed M&A transaction 
would improve financial stability and resilience of the firms involved. Banking 
supervisors should carefully assess each transaction on its own merits. Consolidation 
among banks should meet a number of criteria (see below) to ensure that it is 
compatible with prudential objectives and that the risks outlined in the previous 
section do not materialise. 
4.2.1 Generate synergies
A consolidation project should lead to operating and financial synergies that will 
enhance revenues, reduce operating costs and lower capital costs [Copeland and 
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Weston (1988), Ayadi et al. (2013)]. Cost and revenue efficiencies are key elements in 
ensuring that the merged bank is less exposed to risks and becomes more resilient 
[Fiordelisi et al. (2011)]. However, to achieve these synergies, the merged entity needs 
to formulate a strategy that would identify, assess and exploit them efficiently, while 
avoiding over-optimistic assumptions. More precisely, the strategy underlying the 
consolidation project should consider cost complementarities, the integrations of 
infrastructures and the rationalisation of banking networks [Ayadi et al. (2013)]. 
4.2.2 Diversify sources of revenue
The consolidation strategy should provide a clear understanding of the main 
profitability drivers of the project. The strategy should aim at diversifying the sources 
of revenue and exploiting the revenue synergies resulting from the business 
combination. In the current low interest rate and low growth environment, there is an 
increasing pressure on banks to generate revenue. With low organic growth in 
mature banking markets in Europe, acquisition offers a possible way for banks to 
remediate the long-lasting concern about revenue generation. It is also a way 
to diversify revenue sources through access to new products or markets, for example 
by increasing fee income activities and diversifying from net interest income, or by 
accessing a new geographical market. Moreover, cross-border mergers can provide 
strategic diversification benefits [Altunbas and Marqués-Ibáñez  (2004)]. A more 
diversified business mix can be more resilient to risks as long as individual business 
lines are not perfectly correlated [Elsas et al. (2010)]. This can help banks to become 
more profitable, increase performance and reduce risks. Diversification benefits 
should be measured and managed in a prudent and balanced way.
4.2.3 Ensure that the merged firm is well capitalised
An important criterion for a successful consolidation is the capitalisation level of the 
merged entities, as the capitalisation of banks affects their efficiency [Berger and 
DeYoung (1997), Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997), Williams (2004)]. Indeed, well-capitalised 
banks are more likely to reduce their costs through an adequate cost-reduction 
strategy and to become more efficient [Jeitschko and Jeung  (2005), Fiordelisi 
et al. (2011)]. Stronger capitalisation also provides larger capital buffers to deal with 
the materialisation of any downside risks to the transaction. It is therefore important 
that the strategy underlying the consolidation project sets up a proper capitalisation 
plan that ensures full compliance with regulatory requirements and that can be 
adequately monitored by the merged entity. A thorough capital plan is a key factor in 
obtaining long-term efficiency gains that will ultimately guarantee the sustainability 
of the bank.
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4.2.4 Ensure a stronger refinancing base
The consolidation project should be based on a sound funding strategy that 
guarantees a funding mix in line with the business model of the merged entity. 
It  should aim at achieving stable funding. Lower risk and improved profitability 
catalysed by the merger can translate into a lower cost of funding and better funding 
conditions, and deliver a stronger refinancing base for the merged entity. 
4.2.5 Strong governance and management of change
Acquirers should be well-equipped to integrate the target, at both the operational and 
the strategic level. Indeed, in order to obtain the desirable technical efficiency 
and resilience, the consolidation project should rely on a proper strategy to manage 
the merged entities’ resources and adopt adequate input-output mixes depending 
on prices, costs, the risk diversification strategy and revenue synergies [Ayadi 
et al. (2013)]. 
Nevertheless, execution of the strategy is as important as its design and planning in 
ensuring a successful consolidation. Strong governance and management structures 
are key elements in ensuring the monitoring and proper steering of the operational 
and strategic aspects of the consolidation project. For the consolidation to be 
efficient, the merged entity should be able to take managerial actions which translate 
the strategy into tangible results. Its management body and board of directors 
should be able to respond with corrective actions in the event of deviations from the 
initial strategy [Weber  (2017)]. A strong management structure should generally 
follow the principles set out in the EBA Guidelines on internal governance (EBA/
GL/2017/11). More precisely, in the case of a consolidation project, those principles 
imply developing, for the post-merger phase, a clear decision-making capacity for 
the new structure of the group, a consistent allocation of responsibilities and 
decision-making processes, a strong leadership team with a proven track record, 
not only in banking but also in consolidation projects, and a risk management and 
internal control framework which should be implemented in a timely fashion to be 
efficient. Furthermore, the consolidation strategy needs to be supported by adequate 
remuneration schemes to ensure that management incentives are aligned with the 
objectives of the merger.
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5 Practical response to the expected interest in consolidation
5.1 ECB guide on consolidation: overview of the supervisory approach 
5.1.1 Role of the ECB as a supervisor in the context of consolidation 
In the context of consolidation, the role of ECB Banking Supervision is to assess 
from a prudential perspective M&A transactions arising in the market. Consolidation 
must remain a market-driven process, and therefore supervisors do not aim to 
promote specific types of consolidation. They monitor whether transactions 
prompted by the market comply with prudential requirements and supervisory 
expectations. Transactions should be based on a credible business and integration 
plan which improves the sustainability of the business model and respect high 
standards of governance and risk management to ensure that the combined entity 
achieves a viable and sustainable prudential position overall. 
Over recent years, market participants have expressed an increasing interest in 
understanding how ECB Banking Supervision would assess proposed mergers and 
acquisitions concerning banks under its supervision. Although the risks associated 
with low profitability and overcapacity in the banking sector in Europe are widely 
recognised, there might have been a misperception in the market that ECB Banking 
supervision was in practice opposed to consolidation [Enria (2020)]. 
In order to address market concerns and clarify its supervisory expectations 
regarding sustainable consolidation projects, on 12 January 2021 ECB Banking 
Supervision published its Guide on the supervisory approach to consolidation in the 
banking sector [ECB (2021)]. 
Greater transparency is intended to make supervisory actions more predictable and 
to avoid any misperceptions of supervisory expectations. This article is part of ECB 
Banking Supervision’s effort to increase the transparency and predictability of 
supervisory approaches and supervisory outcomes. 
5.1.2 Main principles followed by the ECB in the assessment process
The Guide lays down the main principles that ECB Banking Supervision uses as a 
starting point when assessing consolidation projects. However, as ECB Banking 
Supervision knows from experience, there cannot be a “one size fits all” approach to 
banking sector consolidation. Consequently, ECB Banking Supervision takes a 
case-by-case approach, based on the proportionality principle, and the main 
principles of its Guide will be tailored to the specificities of each transaction. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 99 FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW, ISSUE 40 SPRING 2021
The ECB expects the applicants to present a credible strategy underlying the 
consolidation transaction. That strategy should be based on conservative 
assumptions and demonstrate that the merged entity would be able to maintain full 
compliance with the applicable prudential requirements. The ECB will assess the 
plausibility of the strategy in the light of expected macroeconomic and financial 
developments. In doing so, it will take into account the criteria for consolidation 
outlined in the previous section. Among other elements, it will review balance sheet 
and profitability projections, the liquidity and funding structure and the governance 
and risk management framework. Regarding the latter, the ECB expects that it would 
follow the principles laid down in the applicable EBA guidelines and that it would be 
adequate to deal with possible execution risks and integration challenges. 
The Guide provides particularly focused guidance on three key prudential aspects: 
the setting of Pillar 2 capital requirements and guidance, the treatment of badwill 
and the use of internal models. In so doing, the Guide aims to clarify how supervisors 
use their powers with respect to consolidation projects within the current regulatory 
framework.
5.1.3 Capital requirements
The Guide clarifies that the determination of Pillar 2 requirements (P2R) and Pillar 2 
guidance (P2G) of the combined entity will use the weighted average of the pre-
merger P2R and P2G levels of the two combining entities as a starting point. Subject 
to a case-by-case assessment, this starting point can be adjusted upwards or 
downwards. More precisely, two principles will be given due consideration for the 
determination of the post-merger P2R and P2G: 
 — an assessment of the risk profile with a particular focus on the strategy to 
mitigate the weaknesses of the combined entity and the execution risk in 
the business plan; 
 — the reflection of the risk profile of the combined entity in the level of Pillar 2 
capital.
ECB Banking Supervision undertakes to provide an indication of the capital 
requirements applicable to the combined entity during the application process. 
These capital requirements are expected to remain unchanged for a least a year in 
order to provide certainty to the combined entity. Adjustments to these initial 
requirements can be expected if any substantial new developments arise during the 
implementation phase. As a general rule, it is expected that the first post-merger 
regular SREP will not result in an increased own funds requirement. However, 
following the completion of the consolidation project, the combined entity will be 
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subject to enhanced monitoring, which may lead to further adjustments to capital 
requirements 
The intensity of the supervisory response of ECB Banking Supervision will mainly 
reflect material deviations from the business plan, considering that the costs of a 
business combination are generally frontloaded, whereas the benefits come later. 
Capital requirements could be lowered if the bank is able to demonstrate that the 
business combination is generating an effective improvement in the resilience and 
risk profile of the merged entity, for example owing to materialisation of diversification 
benefits and/or cost synergies.
In its action, where appropriate ECB Banking Supervision will liaise with relevant 
authorities, such as the Single Resolution Board, to anticipate, inter alia, issues 
regarding the resolvability of the combined entity. ECB Banking Supervision will also 
liaise with the relevant macroprudential authorities. 
5.1.4 Badwill
ECB Banking Supervision expects profits stemming from badwill to contribute to the 
capital of the combined entity. In its Guide, ECB Banking Supervision clarifies its 
supervisory expectations regarding the treatment of badwill. Badwill is generated if 
an entity acquires another entity at a price that is below the estimated fair value of 
its assets net of the value of its liabilities. This accounting gain is recognised as a 
one-off profit. However, badwill is likely to reflect external investors’ uncertainties 
regarding the valuation and the profitability perspectives of the acquired entity. 
Therefore, in order to address those concerns, the acquirer is expected to invest in 
the sustainability of the business model of the combined entity and not to pay out 
profits stemming from badwill as dividends until the soundness of the business 
model has been firmly established. 
ECB Banking Supervision expects badwill to be subject to a thorough and prudent 
valuation. It will recognise “duly verified accounting badwill from a prudential 
perspective, expecting it to be appropriately calculated after thorough accounting 
recognition and valuation of assets and liabilities”. This valuation is also expected to 
fully reflect the adjustments required by prudential regulations and to take into 
account ECB Banking Supervision guidance. 
5.1.5 Internal models
In the case of a consolidation transaction, the continued use of internal models can 
raise concerns, as approval to use internal models is not transferable from one legal 
entity to another. As explained in the Guide, if the consolidation transaction results 
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in the formation of a new legal entity, a legal issue arises, as new legal entities 
cannot have approval to use internal models from the outset. If the consolidation 
transaction results in one legal entity absorbing another legal entity, the acquirer 
may have neither approval to apply its internal models to the newly acquired 
exposures, nor permission to use the model of the acquired entity. 
However, ECB Banking Supervision will accept the temporary use of existing internal 
models subject to a strong roll-out plan aimed at tackling specific internal model 
issues created by the merger. This temporary tolerance will apply until banks have 
adapted their models to the new consolidated entity and received approval for their 
use. Indeed, a temporary return to the standardised approach could lead 
unnecessarily to higher capital requirements and a reduction in risk sensitivity. 
Therefore, the aim of this temporary tolerance is to prevent any supervisory burden 
that could result from such a situation. 
ECB Banking Supervision will set the duration of this temporary tolerance, taking 
into account the specificities of each situation. Sufficient time will be provided for 
such transition to be performed smoothly and ensure that the updated internal 
model framework of the combined entity fully meets the requirements of ECB 
Banking Supervision.
5.2 Issues outside of the remit of the banking supervisor 
The expected interest in bank consolidation is also likely to raise issues that fall 
outside the remit of banking supervisors. M&A transactions affect the structure of 
the market, may reduce competition, and could amplify systemic risks associated 
with the presence of large and complex banks. These issues are of concern to, 
among others, macroprudential authorities. They may also be of interest to 
competition authorities, resolution authorities and other stakeholders in the public 
sector. Cooperation between these authorities and microprudential supervisors is 
therefore essential when assessing a specific consolidation proposal. 
5.2.1 Market structure and competition concerns
Within the single market and the banking union, consolidation could be assessed 
from a competition and market structure angle from both a European and a national 
perspective. The choice of perspective may be related to the nature of the business. 
Some banking services lend themselves more to being offered on a cross-border 
basis, such as investment banking or lending to large corporates, while markets for 
other services may be domestic or even, as in case of retail banking services in 
some countries, regional. As a general consideration, the implications of consolidation 
for market structure and competition may be of less concern in the case of cross-
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border mergers than domestic mergers and in the case of mergers which aim at 
diversifying revenues than mergers aimed at generating cost synergies. 
Market structures differ substantially between national banking markets in the euro 
area, and this has implications for the desirable direction of further consolidation. 
The share of the five largest credit institutions, which is a standard measure of 
market concentration, varies from about 30% in Luxembourg and Germany to over 
90% in Estonia, Greece and Lithuania (see Chart 6). Looking at a broader range of 
competition indicators, Gardó and Klaus (2019) also conclude that the contribution 
of competition to the comprehensive indicator of overcapacity in the euro area 
banking sector varies significantly between countries. Recent ECB studies suggest 
that, at the aggregate euro area level, there is room for further consolidation without 
endangering financial stability, and that the recent increases in concentration seem 
advantageous to financial stability [Huljak, Reghezza and Rodriguez d’Acri (2019)]. 
However, this aggregate conclusion may not apply to every country, and the room 
for domestic consolidation in the countries where the banking sector is already 
highly concentrated and individual banks command high market power may therefore 
be limited.
Further reduction in competition may lead to suboptimal outcomes for both 
consumers and financial stability. Lower market power of banks is often associated 
with greater access to finance and lower cost of finance [Claessens and 
Laeven  (2005), Chauvet and Jacolin  (2017)], although evidence supporting an 
opposite view has also been brought forward [Fungacova et al. (2017)] and ascribed 
to a weakening of lending relationships caused by increased competition, which in 
turn increases monitoring costs for lenders. Economic literature suggests that the 
relationship between competition and financial stability is ambiguous and may 
vary due to country-specific factors [Beck, De Jonghe and Schepens (2013)]. More 
competition could encourage stronger risk-taking [Allen and Gale (2004)], but also 
serve as an incentive to improve the efficiency of banks and to lower lending rates, 
which increases the prospect that borrowers might be able to repay their debts 
[Martínez-Miera and Repullo  (2010)]. This may produce an inverted U-shaped 
relationship in which both too little and too much competition could put financial 
stability at risk.
Concerns regarding market power are a matter for competition authorities, whose 
approval is required for consolidation operations alongside approval from 
supervisory authorities. It is the role of competition authorities to assess whether 
concentration is detrimental to customers and ECB Banking Supervision takes 
their stance fully on board when assessing consolidation projects. There is a 
balance to be struck between competition which encourages market participants 
to innovate and to improve their products, and competition which might lead 
market participants to take excessive risks, for example by increasing their share 
of riskier assets, a situation that could be detrimental to financial stability. 
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Competition authorities and prudential authorities need to liaise closely to find this 
balance [Angeloni (2016)]. 
Cross-border consolidation may offer a solution to competition concerns. In 
principle, take-overs of domestic banks by new entrants would not materially change 
the market structure, but could help unlock synergies and diversification benefits. 
Nevertheless, cross-border consolidation comes with specific risks that warrant 
careful assessment. 
Remaining regulatory impediments to cross-border mergers in the Single Market 
should be carefully assessed and, where possible, lifted. The development of 
the  single rulebook has significantly reduced the regulatory fragmentation of the 
European banking landscape, and the creation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism 
(SSM) led to further harmonisation of supervisory practices. The SSM also 
harmonised the application of many of the existing national options and discretions 
available to supervisors in EU Member States participating in the banking union 
[ECB  (2016)]. These actions should facilitate cross-border consolidation by 
addressing many of the constraints identified in the economic literature [Buch and 
DeLong (2012)]. The existence of a Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) is also an 
important factor in ensuring homogeneous treatment of banking difficulties in the 
banking union. That notwithstanding, national specificities remain embedded in 
national laws [see Gardella et al. (2020)]. 
Cross-border banking groups are often unable to manage their capital and liquidity 
on a fully consolidated basis. Among other issues, this is due to the presence of 
national large exposure limits and to ring-fencing of capital and bail-in-able liabilities 
in the local subsidiaries [Praet (2018)]. While supervisors may grant liquidity waivers 
CONCENTRATION IN NATIONAL BANKING MARKETS IN THE SSM AREA
Chart 6
SOURCE: ECB macroprudential database.
NOTE: CR5 denotes the share of the five largest credit institutions in the total assets of the national banking sector. Countries 
below (above) the bisecting line show a higher (lower) concentration ratio in 2019 than in 2009. Countries: AT - Austria, BE - 
Belgium, BG - Bulgaria, CY - Cyprus, DE - Germany, EE - Estonia, ES - Spain, FI - Finland, FR - France, GR - Greece, IE - 
Ireland, IT - Italy, LT - Lithuania, LU - Luxembourg, LV - Latvia, MT - Malta, NL - The Netherlands, PT - Portugal, SI - Slovenia, 
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to banking groups, liquidity requirements applied at the individual bank level and 
national ring-fencing measures may prevent parent companies from efficiently 
managing their liquidity resources within the group, even within the banking union 
[see Enria and Fernandez-Bollo (2020), who estimate that about €200 billion of high-
quality liquid assets in cross-border subsidiaries of significant credit institutions are 
not transferable]. 
Further harmonisation would only be possible if lawmakers take the initiative to 
reduce further such obstacles to cross-border consolidation. Indeed, more can be 
done to remove incentives for ring-fencing by providing safeguards for the resilience 
of subsidiaries in cross-border groups. In particular, the enforceability of intra-group 
financial support agreements could be strengthened. As proposed by Enria and 
Fernandez-Bollo (2020), one possibility would be to link the granting of cross-border 
liquidity waivers to the presence of adequate intragroup financial support agreements 
included in the recovery plans to map out the appropriate triggers for providing 
intragroup support at an early stage, which would be well before the bank might be 
considered to be failing or likely to fail, and granting the supervisor the power to 
enforce the provision of support under specific circumstances. 
5.2.2 Macroprudential concerns related to systemically important banks
Macroprudential authorities also need to assess concerns related to consolidation 
where it would increase the systemic footprint of large banks. As with all 
macroprudential instruments specified in EU law, the role of the ECB in this context 
is laid down in the SSM Regulation.6 The national designated authorities are tasked 
with setting macroprudential capital buffers, subject to a review by the ECB, which 
has the power to object to the national decisions or to set higher capital buffers than 
proposed by the national authorities.
The regulatory framework already provides for instruments that address the systemic 
risks generated by the presence of large and complex banks. 
Since the global financial crisis, regulators have implemented an integrated set of 
policy measures to reduce the probability and impact of the failure of systemically 
important financial institutions. While consolidation may mechanically lead to an 
increase in the systemic importance of a bank, this effect could be countered by 
appropriate macroprudential measures and measures taken to ensure that the 
merged bank remains resolvable. Macroprudential authorities are mandated to set 
capital buffers for systemically important institutions, at both the global level (G-SIIs) 
6 Article 5 of the Council Regulation (EU) No. 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the 
European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (OJ L 287, 
29.10.2013, p. 63).
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and the domestic level (referred to as Other Systemically Important Institutions or 
O-SIIs). The calibration of these capital buffers should be related to the size, 
interconnectedness, cross-border activities, complexity and substitutability of 
activities of the identified banking groups vis-à-vis the rest of the banking system 
[EBA  (2014b)]. In most EU countries, macroprudential authorities have adopted 
bucket schemes based on ranges of scores of systemic importance to determine 
the calibration of O-SII capital buffers [EBA  (2020)]. This standard approach 
mechanically links a meaningful increase in the systemic footprint of a merged firm 
to a larger capital buffer, thereby in principle recognising and appropriately 
addressing the greater risks resulting from the increased systemic importance at the 
domestic level. From 2023 onwards, G-SIIs will be additionally subject to a surcharge 
on their leverage ratio requirements. Banks are also required to hold additional loss-
absorbing capacity to facilitate their effective resolution. Finally, concerns about 
increased systemic footprint could also be mitigated by the positive effects of risk 
diversification which consolidation often aims to achieve.
Notwithstanding this progress, the buffer framework, owing to its reliance on 
consolidated group-level data, may put cross-border mergers at a disadvantage, in 
particular in the banking union setting, where the resolution of systemically important 
banks is funded and implemented at the European level. A cross-border transaction 
would substantially increase the systemic importance of the acquiring bank, and 
that increase would be particularly steep if the bank is based in a country where the 
banking sector is domestically focused.7 The acquisition of a bank operating in 
another country may, in certain circumstances, be more capital-intensive than a 
domestic acquisition of the same size.8 However, this would not account for two 
important dimensions. A cross-border acquisition could produce diversification 
benefits that reduce the risk to the domestic financial sector. In the banking union 
context, where the large banks fall under the remit of the Single Resolution Board 
(SRB), the risks associated with the potential failure of an internationally active bank 
would also fall on the entire banking union and not solely on the domestic financial 
sector.
EU lawmakers have already accounted for the existence of the banking union in the 
context of the capital buffers for G-SIIs. In addition to the standard and well-
established methodology agreed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
7 Under the harmonised scoring methodology provided for under the EBA Guidelines on the criteria to determine 
the conditions of application of Article 131(3) of Directive 2013/36/EU (CRD) in relation to the assessment of other 
systemically important institutions (O-SIIs) (EBA/GL/2014/10), cross-border exposures have a fixed weight of 
16.66% in the total O-SII score. In an extreme case where the banking sector has no prior cross-border exposure, 
a foreign acquisition may therefore increase the score of the acquiring bank mechanically by at least 1,666 basis 
points, which is likely to significantly increase the applicable O-SII buffer rate. These effects would be less 
pronounced if the acquiring bank operates in a banking system which has non-negligible cross-border operations. 
8 In fact, as the O-SII framework provides a relative measure of banks’ systemic importance within the system, it 
can eventually yield a perverse outcome in which the O-SII buffer applicable to the bank taking over a foreign bank 
increases mechanically, while the O-SII buffers of its competitors decrease (as the higher score obtained by the 
merged bank mechanically reduces in the scores of the other banks).
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(BCBS), national designated authorities may also use an alternative EU-specific 
methodology which treats cross-border activities within the banking union as 
domestic activities. They may subsequently reduce the capital buffer for a G-SII 
based in their country if the G-SII score obtained under this alternative methodology 
is suitably lower.9
Extending such an approach to the O-SII framework would address the currently 
unequal treatment of domestic and other cross-border exposures within the banking 
union. As a European authority, the ECB treats the euro area and all other EU 
countries participating in European banking supervision as a single jurisdiction. 
A  European perspective on systemic importance and “too big to fail” – which is 
different from the national perspective of the Member State – is justified by the 
common supervision and resolution framework applicable within the banking union.
ECB Banking Supervision fully recognises the potential issues raised by the increased 
systemic importance of banks participating in mergers and acquisitions. The ECB 
monitors the level of O-SII buffers to ensure that relevant systemic and macroprudential 
risks are addressed in a consistent manner within and across SSM countries, as 
specified in the SSM Regulation, in close relationship with macroprudential 
authorities. As resolvability is a key part of risk mitigation, resolution authorities, in 
particular the Single Resolution Board, also play an important role in addressing the 
side effects of bank consolidation on the systemic footprint of large banks.
6 Conclusions
Euro area bank profitability was weak prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, and the 
weaknesses have been amplified by the macro-financial shocks associated with 
the  pandemic. However, the decline in profitability was unevenly distributed 
among the underperformers, as banks holding large legacy NPL stocks saw a steep 
decline in profitability. Another major group of weak performers – banks whose 
income-generating capacity was low – seem to have been more resilient, as their 
aggregate profitability remained broadly unchanged, albeit at a continued low level. 
The pandemic could be a catalyst for bank consolidation which could, in the medium 
to long term, address some of the profitability challenges in the euro area banking 
9 This alternative methodology allows national macroprudential authorities to assign a G-SII to the next lower 
subcategory of G-SIIs than that implied by the standard G-SII score. G-SIIs already assigned to the lowest 
subcategory cannot be moved to a lower subcategory. See Article 131(10)(c) of the Capital Requirements Directive 
(CRD) (Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the 
activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending 
Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC, OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338) and 
the EBA’s draft regulatory technical standard amending Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No. 1222/2014 
on the specification of the methodology for the identification of global systemically important institutions 
(RTS/2020/08).
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sector. Consolidation could unlock cost savings and revenue synergies and improve 
the operational and financial resilience of the institutions involved. It could also be 
beneficial from a financial stability perspective, by improving the resilience and 
efficiency of the banking system and strengthening its ability to adapt to structural 
challenges. However, as illustrated by many historical case studies, bank 
consolidation may give rise to execution and financial risks, and it comes with side 
effects, such as the increase in the systemic importance of large banks and in the 
market power of individual banks. Some of these side effects could be addressed by 
cross-border consolidation within the Single Market. 
In view of the expected interest in bank consolidation, the ECB has recently issued 
supervisory expectations which clarify how the ECB will assess mergers from a 
microprudential perspective. Consolidation should remain a market-driven process, 
but not all mergers would be aligned with the micro- and macroprudential objectives. 
The merger applicants should demonstrate that a specific transaction would not put 
compliance with prudential requirements at risk, and that the financial and execution 
risks are well understood and managed. The ECB has also clarified its approach to 
capital requirements, use of internal models, and prudential treatment of badwill. 
Mergers may also require an assessment by competition authorities, and may have 
structural implications for macroprudential policy. The ECB will continue to liaise 
with relevant authorities as appropriate.
Finally, more regulation targeted at furthering financial integration will be necessary 
to complete the banking union, and further contribute to enhancing the level playing 
field in the Single Market in order to achieve a genuinely single rulebook for banking, 
free from national discretions and “home biases”. Ultimately, implementation of the 
European Deposit Insurance Scheme should fully remove incentives for ring-fencing. 
Higher integration is expected to facilitate cross-border consolidation and cross-
border banking, thereby allowing the banking sector to fully reap the profitability and 
financial stability gains of a truly single banking jurisdiction. 
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